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Simchi-Levi: Search Warrants in the Digital Age

SEARCH WARRANTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Yuval Simchi-Levi*

L INTRODUCTION

Digital devices and social media are a major part of American
society, given the increasing use of "smart" phones. Chief Justice John
Roberts observed that such cell phones are so prevalent in society that
"the proverbial visitor from Mars [would] conclude that they were an
important feature of human anatomy." 1 One study estimated that "sevenin-ten Americans use social media to connect with one another .... ,,2
This is not surprising considering that in 2016, eighty-one percent of all
cell phones in the United States were smartphones. 3
Given the ubiquity of social media and digital storage devices4 in
American society, criminals, witnesses, and victims are likely to have
social media accounts as well as cell phones. It should be obvious that
today, digital storage devices and social media accounts contain a trove
of evidence necessary to investigate and prosecute almost any crime.
Whenever there is a mass shooting in the United States, it is almost
reflexive for law enforcement and the media simply to look at the public
postings on the perpetrator's social media to determine the motive for
the tragedy.5 As one journalist wrote, social media is often the "best way
* Yuval Simchi-Levi is an Assistant District Attorney in the New York County District
Attorney's Office. The views expressed in this Article are his own. The Author wishes to thank
Timothy C. Stone for his valuable comments and insight.
1. Rileyv. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
2. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/factsheet/social-media.
3. Tessa Jolls & Michele Johnsen, Media Literacy: A FoundationalSkill for Democracy in
the 21st Century, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1379, 1404 (2018).
4. In this Article, I refer to digital storage devices in a broad sense to refer to devices that
contain digital evidence, such as cell phones, computers, laptops, iPads, and flash drives. See, e.g.,
Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence: The Case for Use Restrictions on
NonresponsiveData, 48 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 1, 2 n.1, 12 (2015).
5. Jonathan Mahler & Julie Turkewitz, Ex-Soldier with a Troubled Past and an Interest in
Black Power Groups, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2016, at A13, https://www.nytimes.com/
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to find the story behind the story" because "[p]eople reveal themselves"
on social media. 6 In 2013, a survey of law enforcement officials found
that over eighty percent of those surveyed reported solving crimes with
the aid of social media. 7 In a study from 2010, eighty-one percent of
matrimonial attorneys surveyed stated that they had used evidence from
social media in their cases.8 Specifically, sixty-six percent of lawyers
reported that they used evidence from Facebook. 9
In today's world, digital data stored on cell phones and social media
accounts provide additional evidence even in the most basic of criminal
cases. For instance, in a common assault case, the perpetrator, victim,
and witnesses may upload a video or photographs of the actual fight and
subsequent injuries, as well as comment on the fight on social media. In
a case where the police have stopped a car and a person inside the
vehicle is found with a large amount of drugs, a search warrant of that
person's cell phone may reveal-through text messages-that the person
works for a drug-trafficking organization and perhaps even videos of the
person weighing drugs. In a shooting case in which the perpetrator is
arrested a few days later and claims he was elsewhere at the time of the
crime, his social media IP logins can show that he was not where he
claimed to be during the shooting. In the case of simple possession of a
stolen credit card, a social media and iCloud account search warrant can
show that the person with the stolen credit card was buying stolen credit
cards from friends who were, in turn, downloading those financial
accounts from the dark web. In any case where two criminals are
accused of acting-in-concert, a cursory examination of either person's
2016/07/09/us/suspect-in-dallas-attack-had-interest-in-black-power-groups.html; see also Howard
Cohen, At Least 11 DeadAfter Shooter Enters Pittsburgh'Synagogue andSaid 'All Jews Must Die,'
Report Says, MIAMI HERALD (Oct 27, 2018, 11:33 AM), https://www.miamiherald.com/
news/nation-world/national/article220729270.html ("As news broke of the shooting and subsequent
arrest, the suspect's social media accounts revealed a history of anti-Semitic posts.").
6. Kevin Roose, SearchingSocial Mediafor Clues About Violent Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
-7, 2018, at A2, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/reader-center/synagogue-shooting-socialmedia.html.
7. See, e.g., Bruce Wright, Police Expand Social Media Reach to Help Solve Cases, Fight
4
Crime, BOS. GLOBE (May 5, 2014), https://www.boston.com/news/innovation/201 /05/05/policeexpand-social-media-reach-to-help-solve-cases-figt-crime.
8. Zoe Rosenthal, Note, "Sharing" with the Court: The Discoverability of Private Social
Media Accounts in Civil Litigation, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 227, 229

(2014); see, e.g., Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., No. 3:11-cv-81-RLY-WGH, 2013 WL 3366278, at
*1-3 (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2013) (allowing defendant to discover private Facebook information in a
negligence action where plaintiffs were allegedly burned by higher-than-intended levels of acid in
the water of an attraction at a theme park); Howell v. Buckeye Ranch Inc., No. 2:11 -cv-1014, 2012
WL 5265170, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 1, 2012) (holding that private social media information was
discoverable in an employment discrimination case where the plaintiff accused male supervisors
and co-workers of making sexual comments and touching her inappropriately).
9. Rosenthal, supranote 8, at 230.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss3/9

2

Simchi-Levi: Search Warrants in the Digital Age

2019)

SEARCH WARRANTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE

social media account may uncover photographs of the two individuals
together, demonstrating unequivocally that they knew one another. And,
most critically, evidence exonerating individuals accused of crimes may
be located in their social media accounts and cell phones as well.
Despite the pervasiveness of electronic evidence, courts are still
trying to resolve several significant questions in this context that directly
impact criminal investigations.1 ° For instance, as to social media
accounts, some courts have ruled that the government should be limited
in what it can search.11 As to both digital storage devices and social
media accounts, it is unresolved what law enforcement officials should
do when they execute search warrants on these devices or social media
accounts and in turn encounter evidence of unrelated crimes. 12
This Article argues that, although some courts distinguish between
the scope of digital storage device search warrants and social media
search warrants, the same analysis should apply to all electronically
stored evidence.13 This Article further contends that when searches of
digital storage devices and social media accounts are executed in a
reasonable manner and in accordance with the search, the plain-view
doctrine should apply.14
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part II, the legal requirements
for searching cell phones and social media accounts are explained. 5 In
Part III, the practicality of obtaining a search warrant for cell phones and
social media accounts is described.16 Part IV explains why digital
storage devices and social media accounts should be treated similarly. 7
Part V analyzes how the plain-view doctrine applies to digital
evidence.18 Part VI provides an account for how a search into social
media accounts and digital storage devices proposed in this Article fits
squarely into well-established Fourth Amendment analysis. 19

10. See Justin P. Murphy & Adrian Fontecilla, Social Media in Government Investigations
and CriminalProceedings:A Frontierof New Legal Issues, RICH. J. L. & TECH., 2013, at 1, 14.
11. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385, 388 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that both "likes" and
comments on Facebook constitute protected First Amendment speech); Palmieri v. United States, 72
F. Supp. 3d 191, 210 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that once Facebook information was voluntarily
shared with a "friend," including a known government agent, the account holder had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the data).
12. See Murphy & Fontecilla, supra note 10, at 10-11.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Parts IV-V.
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Partll.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part VI.
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II. SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENTS FOR CELL PHONES
AND SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ...

,20 "[A]

warrant may not be issued unless probable cause is properly
established. ' 21 Further, the scope of the search warrant must be set out
with particularity, meaning that the warrant must "particularly describ[e]
22
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." This
prevents "general searches" and limits "the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant. '23 Relatedly, "[a] warrant may be broad, in that it
authorizes the government to search an identified location or object for a
wide range of potentially relevant material. '' 24 Although an "infirmity
due to overbreadth does not doom the entire warrant," it requires the
suppression of evidence beyond its valid portions.2"
A person can challenge a search only when his own Fourth
Amendment rights have been violated.2 6 There is a two-part test to make
that determination: (1) whether a person has exhibited an actual
subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) whether that person's
subjective expectation of privacy,27 when viewed objectively, 'is
"justifiable" under the circumstances.
For most of the history of the United States, Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was focused on "common-law trespass," inquiring
whether the government could physically intrude upon constitutionally
protected areas. 28 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that
the Fourth Amendment does not simply protect property rights, but

20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452,459 (2011); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
584 (1980).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; King, 563 U.S. at 459; see also Payton, 445 U.S. at 585.
23. United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 973 (11th Cir. 2017); Cassady v. Goering, 567 F.3d
628, 635 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV); see United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d
538, 546 (2d Cir. 1984).
24. United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 102 (2d Cir. 2016).
25. United States v. Lowry, No. 16-4139, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 21346, at *5 (6th Cir. Oct.
24, 2017) (quoting United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also United
States v. Flores, 802 F.3d 1028, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723
F.2d 649, 654 (9th Cir. 1984)).
26. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 93, 85 (1980).
27. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967)).
28. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 405, 406 n.3 (2012)).
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instead protects people. 29 Thus, a warrant supported by probable cause is
required whenever the government seeks to search an item that a person
has tried to make private, and when that privacy expectation is one that
society recognizes to be reasonable.3"
In Riley v. California,31 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that
people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phones and
corresponding digital data, given that these devices and remote servers
contain "the privacies of life."32 The Court observed that cell phones are
essentially minicomputers with immense storage capacities whose data
is not even connected to the actual cell phone device, but to a remote
server called a "cloud."33 In that same decision, the Court noted that
within cell phones and associated digital data are applications that
contain "detailed information about all aspects of a person's life."34
By contrast, whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his social media account depends on whether he made some
effort to keep the information in his account private.35 This is because a
social media user can set his account to be available publicly or to be
completely private. A Facebook user, for example, can share his profile
only with "friends," with "friends of friends," or with the public at
large.36 "When a social media user disseminates his postings and
information to the public, [these postings] are not protected by the
Fourth Amendment" because anyone can view them; thus, a search
warrant is not necessary to seize those messages.37 On the other hand,
29. Id.(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
30.

Id.(citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 740).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

573 U.S. 373 (2014).
Id.at 403 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
Id.at 393-94, 396-97.
Id.at 396.
See, e.g., In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 146

(E.D.N.Y. 2013).

36. United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also United
States v. Khan, No. 15-cr-00286, 2017 WL 2362572, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2017); United States
v. Adkinson, No. 4:15-cr-00025-TWP-VTW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54104, at *15 (S.D. Ind. Apr.
7,2017).
37.

Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 525; see also Perry v. Montgomery, No. CV-16-03730-

FMO (KES), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95077, at *35 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2017); United States v.
Gatson, No. 13-705, 2014 WL 7182275, at *22-23 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2014); Palmieri v. United

States, 72 F. Supp. 3d 191, 210 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that the defendant did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the information he made available to "friends" on his Facebook page);
Rosario v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:13-cv-362 JCM (PAL), 2013 WL 3679375, at *5-7 (D. Nev.
July 3, 2013) ("When a person tweets on Twitter to his or her friends, that person takes the risk that
the friend will turn the information over to the government."); Juror No. One v. Superior Court, 142
Cal. Rptr. 3d 151, 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Everett v. State, 186 A.3d 1224, 1230 (Del. 2018)
("[A] Facebook user does not have a reasonable expectation that information that he shares online
with his 'friends' will not be revealed by them.").
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when someone posts using a more secure privacy setting on social
media, this reflects an intent to keep information private, and so that
information may be constitutionally protected." One court even noted
that private Facebook messages are "inherently
39private" because they
"carenot readily accessible to the general public."
III. OBTAINING A SEARCH WARRANT TO SEARCH
A CELL PHONE OR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNT

To obtain a search warrant for a social media account or a digital
storage device, the government must establish a "specific and concrete"
nexus between what is being searched and criminal activity."n Given the
multi-functional uses and ubiquity of social media, it should not be
difficult for the government to articulate why a social media search
warrant is necessary.4 ' Social media provides crucial evidence in
criminal cases because, by its very nature, it connects people to each
other by allowing connected parties to view private postings and to send
and receive private messages, including videos and photographs. 4" For
instance, in United States v. Arnold, a motion to controvert a search
warrant for over three dozen Facebook accounts was denied.4 3 The
government argued that there was a nexus between the accounts and
criminal activity because, inter alia, the account users had publicly
posted photographs of themselves wearing gang clothing, statements
acknowledging the existence of the gang, and references to individuals
by their gang names.' Naturally, the court found that such evidence
38. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 525; see also Commonwealth v. Jenkins, No. 229 EDA
2015, 2016 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 780, at *5 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2016).
39. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010); see also
R.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1142 (D. Minn. 2012)
(quoting Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991).
40. United States v. Johnson, 725 F. App'x 393, 402-03 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v.
Whitt, No. 1:17cr060, 2018 WL 447586, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 17, 2018) (citing United States v.
Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 2016)).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, No. 15-20652, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148120, at *4,
*7, *10 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2017) (denying motion to suppress Facebook evidence in drug
conspiracy case where affidavit cited information from defendants' publicly available profile
including a post accusing another individual of being a "federal informant"); United States v.
Yelizarov, No. MJG-16-0309, 2017 WL 3022927, at *1-2 (D. Md. July 17, 2017) (denying motion
to suppress Facebook evidence where the affidavit cited information from suspect's publicly
available Facebook profile and a statement that "[d]efendant has a history of boasting about his
crimes to others"); United States v. Ortiz-Salazar, No. 4:13CR67, 2015 WL 2089366, at *1-4 (E.D.
Tex. May 4, 2015) (recommending denial of motion to suppress Facebook evidence where the
detective cited information gleaned from defendant's publicly available Facebook profile).
42. Arnold, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148120, at *9-10.
43. Id. at *3.
44. Id. at *9- 10.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss3/9

6

Simchi-Levi: Search Warrants in the Digital Age

2019]

SEARCH WARRANTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE

could be used to establish that all the individuals were involved in a
45
criminal enterprise.
Likewise, it is not difficult to draw a nexus between a cell phone
and allegations -of criminal activity. As the Supreme Court observed,
"[c]ell phones have become important tools in facilitating coordination
and communication among members of criminal enterprises, and can
provide valuable incriminating information ...
."46 The Nebraska
Supreme Court found that because a defendant worked with at least one
other person in committing a series of crimes, it was reasonable to infer
that the defendant's cell phone "was used to communicate with others"
before, during, and after committing the crimes.47 Similarly, in drug
cases, courts have found a sufficient nexus between cell phones and
criminal activity by virtue of the fact that, as a general matter, drug
traffickers communicate about their businesses through cell phones.48
IV. TREATING SEARCH WARRANTS FOR DIGITAL STORAGE DEVICES
AND SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS SIMILARLY

As the Supreme Court observed, cell phones are essentially
"minicomputers" that happen to be used as telephones.4 9 Thus, search
warrants for cell phones should be written and executed as if the devices
are computers. As Professor Orin S. Kerr observed, although the
Supreme Court in Riley was dealing with cases in which cell phones had
been searched, its analysis was "really about computers generally. . .. ""
What this means is that courts should analyze digital storage deviceswhether they be cell phones, tablets, or actual computers-in a similar
manner. Consequently, when courts analyze searches of files on cell
phone devices, courts should not think of them as items in which files
are discretely stored like a filing cabinet. As the Second Circuit observed
in United States v. Ganias,5 1 unlike filing cabinets, files in a digital
storage device are not discretely divided amongst each other.5 2 Instead,
45. Id.
46. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 73,385 (2014).
47. State v. Henderson, 854 N.W.2d 616, 632 (Neb. 2014).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, No. RDB-14-413, 2015 WL 1862329, at *2-3 (D. Md.
Apr. 22, 2015); United States v. Herevia, No. RDB-13-639, 2014 WL 4784321, at *8-9 (D. Md.
Sept. 23, 2014); United States v. Eiland, No. 04-379 (RCL), 2006 WL 516743, at *11-13 (D.D.C.
Mar. 2, 2006).
49. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.
50. Kerr, supra note 4, at 10 n.68.
51. 824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016).
52. Id at 213 (first citing Wayne Jekot, Computer Forensics, Search Strategies, and the
Particularity Requirement, 7 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 13 (2007); and then quoting Josh
Goldfoot, The Physical Computerand the Fourth Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 127-
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on digital storage devices, files will typically be "fragmented" in various
physical locations.53 In other words, "[b]ecause of the manner in which
data is written to the hard drive," files "are stored in multiple locations
When analyzing a digital storage device,
and in multiple forms ....
forensic examiners could discover evidence that a file was deleted, and
they could even reconstruct a deleted file with evidence found in an
"unallocated" space on a hard drive." Still more complicated, various
versions of the same file may exist in different parts of the same drive.56
The Second Circuit found, moreover, that forensic examiners may
need to examine the entirety of a digital storage device to rebut a
defendant's claim that a virus or hack caused a file to appear in the
device. 57 To determine that a virus was not on the device, forensic
examiners must analyze the entirety of the hard drive.58 This is
significant because even with regard to cell phones, a defendant can
argue that photographs, videos, and text messages were placed on his
phone by others. A thorough and complete search of the device can rule
out this theory by showing, for instance, that the cell phone was never
corrupted, or even that the defendant represented that the phone
belonged to him throughout the time the phone was used-such as
by taking photographs of himself or acknowledging the receipt of a
text message.
Courts are divided as to whether to view social media search
warrants similarly or differently than warrants for digital data in storage
devices. In United States v. Blake,59 the Eleventh Circuit found a search
warrant for a Facebook account to be unconstitutional because the
warrant requested that Facebook provide "virtually every kind of data
that could be found in a social media account."6 The Eleventh Circuit
noted that the government could have limited its request from Facebook
to a search of the private messages between those suspected of being
involved in the offense, and the court supported limiting the warrant to
"the period of time during which [the defendant] was suspected of taking
62
part in the prostitution conspiracy."6 But in United States v. Ulbricht,
"4

28(2011)).
53. Id. (quoting Jekot, supranote 52, at 13).
54. Id. (first quoting Jekot, supra note 52, at 13; and then citing Goldfoot, supra note 52, at
127-28) (quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 213-14.
56. Id. at 213.
57. Id. at 214.
58. Id. (quoting Goldfoot, supra note 52, at 141).
59. 868 F.3d 960 (1lth Cir. 2017).
60. Id. at 973-75.
61. Id. at 974.
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in its review of a search warrant for a laptop, the Second Circuit rejected
the defendant's argument that the warrant should have been more
specific because "[f]iles and documents can easily be given misleading
or coded names

.",

In rejecting the defendant's challenges to

Facebook warrants, the Second Circuit simply stated that it found the
Facebook search warrants valid for the same reasons that it found the
laptop search warrant valid. 6'
The distinction some courts have drawn between digital storage
devices and social media accounts appears to be based on the belief that
the government can clearly communicate to the social media company
precisely what it needs-and by doing so, receive discrete messages,
photographs, videos, etc.65 The Eleventh Circuit in Blake was under the
impression that the government could request that Facebook provide
certain conversations between the target account and those the
government suspected of complicity in the crimes, thereby omitting
conversations between the target account and others.66 But it is not clear
why the Eleventh Circuit thought this. Indeed, as the government could
have no way of knowing every single account involved in the crimes
in that case, it is unclear why the Eleventh Circuit even addressed
the matter.
In any event, and for several reasons, the Eleventh Circuit in Blake
was mistaken in requiring that Facebook only provide a limited response
to the target account, and the flaws in the court's reasoning illustrate
why the same legal analysis should apply to the scope of search warrants
for digital storage devices and social media accounts.67 First, whereas a
digital storage device is typically found on or near a suspect (thereby
supporting an inference of possession), a social media account will be
identified as belonging to a person because the account name or
"handle" is similar to the person's name, the person's photograph is
shown on the social media account, or others have claimed the person's
social media account. Consequently, the person the government believes
is connected with the social media account can argue that it is not her
account. To account for this-by establishing that the person had control
over the social media account during the time period of the criminal
activity-the government must examine an expansive version of the
62. 858 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2017).
63. Id. at 102.
64. Id. at 104.
65. See Blake, 868 F.3d at 974 ("[W]hen it comes to Facebook account searches, the
government need only send a request with the specific data sought and Facebook will respond with
precisely that data.").
66. Id.
67. See id.
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account to determine how often the person identified himself to be the
owner of the account and provided identifying information to others,
such as telephone numbers, addresses, and photographs.
Second, just like cell phones or other digital storage devices, it is
possible for someone to hack into a Facebook account or other social
68
media accounts and send messages as if they are the account holder.
The government will thus need to acquire a large scope of the account to
show-through IP logins, conversations, postings, etc.-that the suspect
not only created the account but also retained control over it.
Third, it will often be difficult for the government to know the
exact time that a person began to engage in the criminal activity in
question. If someone is suspected of drug dealing, for instance, it will be
challenging to pinpoint the exact date when the person began acting in
furtherance of that crime. A more expansive search warrant for a social
media provider will provide greater insight into how long the person has
been engaged in the particular criminal activity that the government is
investigating or prosecuting.
Fourth, the social media account may demonstrate that the owner of
the account deleted specific incriminating private messages-evidence
probative of a guilty mind. To establish that the account owner did not
delete innocuous conversations, but rather only inculpatory messages,
the government would need access to a significant range of activity on
the account.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit's approach would give Facebook and
other social media providers too much discretion in determining the
appropriate response to the government's search warrant.69 Such power
could lead to concerns that the social media provider is a state agent,
acting as an arm of law enforcement, and that it is not providing a fully
responsive return to the warrant. The concern would be multifold,
including the fact that the social media provider did not adhere to the
search warrant. A comprehensive examination of a target's social media
account, consequently, is often necessary to connect the suspect to the
account and to obtain a complete sense of the criminal activity.

68. See Emily Erickson, Cut Bait or Phish, CREDIT UNION MGMT., Dec. 1, 2018, at 36, 36
("It's important to remember that your friends' social media accounts can be hacked, and those
hacked accounts can be used to post links to malicious websites."); see also Oculus CEO is Latest
Tech Boss Hacked in EmbarrassingAccount Takeover, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2016, 6:24 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/30/oculus-ceo-is-latest-tech-boss-hacked-inembarrassing-account-takeover.
69. See Blake, 868 F.3d at 966-67, 974.
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V. PLAIN-VIEW DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
Another significant question is what happens when a search of
digital storage data or a social media account reveals that a person
has engaged in a number of other crimes unrelated to the crimes
underpinning the search warrant. This question implicates the
"plain-view doctrine," which allows law enforcement to seize an item
when: (1) the officer was lawfully in the place from where the seized
item was in plain-view, (2) the item's incriminating nature was
"immediately apparent," and (3) the officer had "a lawful right of access
to the object itself."7 °
Application of this doctrine in the virtual context is a challenging
question because of the volume of information through which law
enforcement must search through when executing a warrant for a digital
storage device or social media account. One court observed that a
commercially available digital storage device can hold data "roughly
equal to 16 billion thick books."'" As discussed above, unlike physical
objects that can be readily identified, digital storage device files may be
manipulated such that files are hidden, disguised, or even deleted.7 2
Permitting law enforcement to review every file and message-and
then to claim that even those unrelated to the scope of the search warrant
but that demonstrate other crimes, fall into the plain-view
exception--creates "a serious risk" that all electronic search warrants
will become general search warrants, essentially "rendering the Fourth
Amendment irrelevant."73
The majority of federal courts have taken the position that, as long
as the search of digital storage data is "reasonably required to locate the
items described in the warrant based on probable cause," unrelated
evidence can be seized under the plain-view doctrine.74 Departing from
70. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990) (quotation marks omitted).
71. United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199, 218 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Quentin Hardy, As the
Data Deluge Grows, Companies Are Rethinking Storage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2016, at B3,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/technology/as-a-data-deluge-grows-companies-rethinkstorage.html) (quotation marks omitted).
72. United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Hill, 459
F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 237 (3d Cir. 2011)
("[1]t is clear that because criminals can-and often do--hide, mislabel, or manipulate files to
conceal criminal activity, a broad, expansive search of the hard drive may be required."); supra text
accompanying notes 52-56.
73. United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 447 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010)) (quotation marks omitted).
74. United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 538-39 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v.
Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009)) (quotation marks omitted) (adopting a
"reasonableness" analysis on a case-by-case basis in analyzing the plain-view doctrine); see also
United States v. Perez, 712 F. App'x 136, 140 (3d Cir. 2017) (explicitly refusing to adopt a Fourth
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this view, in its per curiam decision in United States v. Comprehensive
Drug Testing, Inc., the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the government's
plain-view doctrine argument on the basis that "everything the
government chooses to seize will, under this theory, automatically come
into plain view."75 A five-judge concurrence, expressing concern with
the government's ability to turn digital storage device warrants into
general warrants, suggested that the government should "forswear
reliance on the plain view doctrine" whenever seeking a search warrant
to examine such a device.7 6
The application of the plain-view doctrine to digital storage devices
taken by the majority of circuit courts makes more sense than the Ninth
Circuit's seemingly blanket opposition to the plain-view doctrine. The
majority's approach is persuasive because it applies the bedrock
law
principle of the Fourth Amendment-reasonableness-to
enforcement's search of large quantities of evidence. A straightforward
analysis of the plain-view doctrine under this majority approach
demonstrates that both courts and law enforcement can be guided as to
what is "reasonable" in this context.
United States v. Carey,77 on the one hand, illustrates an
unreasonable search of digital data.78 In that case, a detective searched a
computer pursuant to a search warrant that authorized him to look for
evidence of drug trafficking.7 9 At some point, while examining the files,
the detective viewed the computer's "JPG" files which contained images
he believed to be child pornography. 8° The detective testified that he
then downloaded the rest of the JPG files because he thought it
contained child pornography, not drugs. 81 The Tenth Circuit suppressed
Amendment search doctrine, and applying a "reasonableness" test to evaluate a digital search);
Galpin, 720 F.3d at 447 ("Once the government has obtained authorization to search the hard drive,

the government may claim that the contents of every file it chose to open were in plain view and,
therefore, admissible even if they implicate the defendant in a crime not contemplated by the
warrant."); Stabile, 633 F.3d at 241 n.16 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Mann); Mann, 592 F.3d at 785 (quoting Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d at 1013
(Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) ("[The best approach is] to allow the

contours of the plain view doctrine to develop incrementally through the normal course of factbased case adjudication."); United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying
the plain-view doctrine to a search of a digital storage device); United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d
981, 987 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a search was valid under the plain-view doctrine where the

search was "reasonable and within the parameters of the search warrant").
75. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d at 1170-71.
76. Id.at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).

77.

172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).

78. Id.at 1276.
79. Id.at 1270.
80. Id.at 1271.

81. Id.at 1273.
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the seized images of child pornography as the result of an unlawful
search.82 The search in Carey did not satisfy the plain-view doctrine
because, by the detective's admission, he was not looking for drugs in
these files but rather child pornography and thus was not guided by the
search warrant that authorized him to look only for drugs.83
By contrast, in United States v. Walser,84 the same court affirmed
the denial of a motion to suppress where it found a plain-view search
reasonable. 85 In that case, as the law enforcement agent lawfully
searched a computer for evidence of drug trafficking, he noticed images
of child pornography.8 6 The agent stopped his search and obtained
another search warrant that allowed him to search the computer for child
pornography.87 The Tenth Circuit made clear that the law enforcement
agent had searched the computer reasonably before obtaining the
subsequent search warrant because he had been looking for evidence of
drug dealing.88
United States v. Mann89 further illustrates the contours of
reasonableness in this area.9 ° Mann involved a search of a computer for
91
evidence that the defendant had videotaped women in a locker room.
The detective executed the search by running a software program that
indexed the data on the computer to reveal the exact quantity of images,
videos, and documents.9 2 When the detective reviewed this material on
the computer, he saw images of child pornography. 3 Based on the
detective's testimony, the district court found that as the detective
perused the computer files and encountered child pornography, "he
never abandoned his search for evidence of voyeurism" and looked only
for child pornography. 94 The Seventh Circuit upheld this search as
reasonable and within the scope of the warrant's authorization because

82. Id. at 1276.
83. Id. at 1273.
84. 275 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2001).
85. Id. at 983, 987.
86. Id.at 984-85.
87. Id.at 985, 987; see also id. at 986 ("Because computers can hold so much information
touching on many different areas of a person's life, there is a greater potential for the
'intermingling' of documents and a consequent invasion of privacy when police execute a search for
evidence on a computer.").
88. Id. at 987.
89. 592 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010).
90. See id at 780-82.
91. Id. at780-81.
92. Id. at 781.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 781-82.
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the discovery of child pornography transpired while law enforcement
was "conducting a systematic search for evidence of voyeurism...."9'
The plain-view analysis adopted by the majority of federal courts
should apply to all digital devices and social media accounts. Just like
computers, when law enforcement authorities examine the contents of a
cell phone or social media account, they are opening a Pandora's box of
"intermingl[ed]" information relating to an individual. 96 So long as
evidence of unrelated crimes is found while executing the search warrant
that provided access to the digital device or social media account, that
evidence should be admissible.
Ultimately, the best practice is that law enforcement-upon
observing evidence of other crimes in a cell phone or a social media
account-apply for an additional search warrant that incorporates the
newly-encountered crimes.97 The new warrant will provide law
enforcement with the ability to look specifically for evidence of the new
crimes and will circumvent litigation about whether the initial digital
device or social media search warrant was merely an improper pretext to
violate the defendant's right to privacy.
VI. CONCLUSION

When the Fourth Amendment was written, there was obviously no
way to envision the world that we live in today with the advent of digital
devices and social media. But no doubt exists that the Fourth
Amendment applies in this context because its "basic purpose... is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by government officials."98 In today's world, some of our most
private information is contained in our cell phones, tablets, computers,
and social media accounts.
With that said, the "touchstone" of Fourth Amendment analysis has
always been reasonableness.9 9 The proposals in this paper-namely, that
the government should be allowed to have broad access to a social media
95. Id. at 786.
96. United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (1Oth Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted).
97. See Mann, 592 F.3d at 786 ("Although we now hold that [the detective's] actions were
within the scope of the warrant, we emphasize that his failure to stop his search and request a
separate warrant for child pornography is troubling."); see also United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d
1078, 1094-95 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[A]s our cases seem to require, [the law enforcement agent]
immediately closed the gallery view when he observed a possible criminal violation outside the
scope of the warrant's search authorization and did not renew the search until he obtained a new
warrant.").
98. Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); see also Riley v. California, 573
U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
99. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016).
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account that it has probable cause to search and that the government
should be able to seize evidence found in plain view in digital storage
devices and social media accounts-are premised on reasonableness."10
Moreover, these proposals provide law enforcement with clear guidance
as to how to search digital storage devices as well as social media
accounts.10 1 Given the ubiquity of digital data, as well as the large
amounts of data law enforcement is required to peruse when executing
search warrants, such reasonable guidance is clearly necessary to aid law
enforcement as well as the courts.

100. Seesupra PartslV-V.
101.

See supra Parts IV-V.
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